Medvedev: Why I Did It

In the Financial Times of 27 Aug 08, Russian President Medvedev explains why “he” (actually Putin, the power behind the throne, as we know), invaded Georgia, pried loose the two territories of South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, then, alone among leaders in the world, recognized them as independent states.

He says that the people of those two regions freely expressed their desire for independence from Georgia in the past, although that hardly justifies an invasion.

The Russian Federation, he explains, "is a harmonious coexistence of many dozens of nations and nationalities, not all of which have their own statehood." “After the collapse of communism, Russia reconciled itself to the loss of 14 former Soviet republics, which became states in their own right, even though some 25 million Russians were left stranded in countries no longer their own.”

But were they ever “their own” if they were republics in the Soviet Union? It is a little slippery to speak in one breath of “republics” (constitutional governments) and of “countries” (not defined), and of “nations” (not defined), and to suggest that their "federation" with the Soviets was ever voluntary.

“Georgia “stripped” the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of their autonomy,” he says. But isn’t that just another way of saying they were no longer part of the Soviet Union? Medvedev implies that these were formerly autonomous countries under the Soviets, although the extent of their autonomy during those times is suspect. Was Hungary "autonomous" in 1956?

However, it is true that in repossessing these regions from Soviets after 1989, the Georgians have acted with a heavy hand, treating the ethnic Russians as second class citizens, outlawing their language, cultural traditions, schools, etc. (exactly as the Soviets had treated the Georgians for 70 years).

Finally, says Medvedev, the newly independent Georgia “inflicted a vicious war on its minority nations.” Russian peacekeepers tried to keep things calm, he says, but Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili “made no secret of his intention to squash the Ossetians and Abkhazians.” ("Squash"?) Finally on August 7, Saakashvili invaded south Ossetia. “Only a madman could have taken such a gamble,” says Medvedev.

“Russia had no option but to crush the attack to save lives. This was not a war of our choice,” he says. “We have no designs on Georgian territory.”

(Click to enlarge this ethnic map).

Then he claims that “The presidents of the two republics appealed to Russia to recognize their independence.” There is no evidence of that beyond his word. And how is it that these territories are once again “republics” in his mind, since he said earlier that they had been “stripped” of their autonomy by the Georgians? And anyway, what sort of political standing does the leader of a province of Georgia have to request a foreign country to recognize its independence?

If the governor of Louisiana, for example, appealed to France to “recognize” its independence from the U.S., would that have any force in international law?

But “based on [unspecified] documents of international law,” he says, Medvedev reluctantly (he would have us believe) agreed to recognize the two regions’ independence from Georgia.

In justification, he notes that just a few years ago, “ignoring Russia’s warnings, western countries rushed to recognize Kosovo’s illegal declaration of independence from Serbia.” Is it tit for tat then? Medvedev conveniently overlooks the fact that the Kosovar Albanians were being slaughtered by the Serbs.

Today, the Christian Science Monitor (www.csmonitor.com/2008/0829/p08s01-comv.html) reports that according to Medvedev, the Georgians were slaughtering ethnic Russians in an equivalent genocide. But there is simply no evidence of that.

It seems pretty obvious that the real reasons for the invasion and re-annexation of these two regions to Russia were 1. Longtime personal enmity between Putin and Shaakashvili (if you don’t think that’s a good enough reason to invade, look at the US in Iraq), 2. Russia’s desire to control the oil and gas resources in the breakaway regions, especially the pipelines to Europe, and 3. Petulant retaliation for the expansion of NATO and the installation of anti-missile sites in Poland.

What perplexes me is why Medvedev felt he must weave an elaborate story that pretends to some high moral ground, when the motivation for the Russian action was plain thuggery. Why couldn’t Medvedev just say, “We wanted those regions; we had the power to take them, so we did.” And he could add, “Neener, neener!” if he wanted to.

Who is fooled by his transparent self-justification?

The Coming War in Iraq

As “the surge” of U.S. troops into Iraq shows no sign of effecting change, a new military strategy is becoming apparent. US troops are cooperating with Sunni militias against al Qaeda. This according to a Washington Post article (Partow, J.: U.S. Strategy on Sunnis Questioned. WP, 6/18/07). Both Kurdish and Shiite leaders are skeptical, hostile, and no doubt fearful about the strategy, especially the Shiite-led central government.

U.S. officials say that “…as long as the Sunni groups are watched closely and kept from mistreating people, the intelligence they provide about al-Qaeda in Iraq makes them valuable partners.”

Could the U.S. commanders really be this naïve? Are they just doing something for the sake of doing something? It seems pretty obvious to everyone (except possibly the military and the White House) that:

1. U.S. troops are going to start coming home soon, probably no later than January 21, 2009. Not all will come back, but the drawdown will begin.

2. It is only the U.S. that keeps the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds from each other’s throats, and we are doing an increasingly poor job of that.

3. The moment U.S. troops are out of there (or mostly out), there will be a full scale civil war, mostly between Sunnis and Shiites. Kurds will be content to establish and protect “Kurdistan.”

4. The Sunnis fully expect Iran to step in with weapons and money, if not with troops, helping them overwhelm the current Shiite dominated government, restoring Sunni rule as it was in the days of Saddam. This is the most likely outcome.

So why on earth would the U.S. be supporting Sunnis with training, weapons and money? An apparent reason is that they are trying to force the Shiite government to reconcile with the Sunnis. This U.S. Sunni partnership is ostensibly executed through the central government’s ministry of interior, but that is just a fig leaf. The central government is openly hostile to the strategy. Reconciliation is an American pipe dream.

Could the U.S. really believe that the main problem in Iraq is al Qaeda? Don’t they see the coming civil war makes al Qaeda irrelevant in Iraq?

When the the civil war has started in earnest, will we be tempted to engage a proxy war against Iran as we back the Shiite central government just as we backed the puppet South Vietnamese government some thirty years ago? If so, the Russians will side with Iran and it will be the cold war all over again. We can only hope it stays cold.

How blind, how stupid, can U.S. policy be? Why can’t we just let go of this invasion that served no purpose in the first place? Why not get out quickly and let Iran have its way in Iraq. Why would that be so bad? Loss of face? Faces can be repainted!

Or we can partition the country now, in a modified Biden plan, granting authority to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to administer the three factions. Let them fight the surrogate war, or stifle it, as they see fit.

Sure, there is risk of broader war, ultimately threatening our dear pals, the Saudis. We can respond to that if we are asked, and if we are not too busy in Afghanistan.

That’s probably the least awful way to extract from a miserable quagmire. Unfortunately, the current administration is so totally blind and arrogant that they probably will make the situation far worse than it is now, closing off even that exit strategy.